The use of shared credentials like AWS access keys, Azure service principal credentials, GCP service account keys and the reuse of passwords between different services is considered by many organizations to be a major vulnerability in cloud based environments through 2026. Once an attacker has access to one of these keys/tokens, they are often able to gain a large amount of access, move around laterally, and ultimately steal data, cryptomine or deploy ransomware.
While recent trends show a shift toward exploiting software vulnerabilities, credential abuse (including shared or leaked ones) continues to play a major role, especially in multi-cloud and hybrid setups. For SMEs, startups, and businesses handling customer data, understanding these practical attack paths strengthens website security and data privacy practices.
The Dangers of Sharing Access Credentials
There are a number of reasons why people may share their credentials with others:
1. Developers use hard-coded keys in code or configuration files.
2. Teams reuse the same access key across projects or environments.
3. Service accounts or long-lived tokens are provided without being rotated.
4. Access keys may have been forgotten and are residing in various locations (i.e. Git, CI/CD pipelines, backups).
Typically, they will bypass many of the detection controls since they seem to be legitimate.
How Attackers Discover Shared Credentials
Attackers will use a combination of scanning for exploits and taking advantage of opportunity:
1. Public Repositories
Attackers will scan GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, and Pastebin using dork results or utilizing tools like TruffleHog or GitLeaks to discover access tokens. Examples of what can be found are AWS access keys (AKIA....), Azure secrets, and .env files that were accidentally committed. Additionally, even private repositories can be discovered if the .gitignore file is misconfigured or if the logs from a CI build are publicly accessible.
2. Infostealer Malware
Certain types of malware installed on developer machines or devices will extract credentials stored in the browser's password, CLI cumulated cache (e.g., ~/.aws/credentials), as well as credentials stored as environment variables (e.g., Azure CLI Token, GCP-based credentials.db).
3. Misconfigured Cloud Resources Sea Buckets are Unsecured
a) Cloud storage services like Amazon S3 Bucket, Azure Blob or Google Cloud Storage exposes publicly accessible copies of the storage buckets that contain backup files or configuration dumps.
b) Metadata Services that give public access to temporary credentials through the instance metadata service (IMDS) for cloud service accounts.
4. CI/CD Pipelines are Unrestricted
Developers or administrators who use Continuous Integration/Continuous Deployment (CI/CD) pipelines to build applications may leak secrets (e.g., passwords or API keys) in the logged output of the build process or in variable files stored unsecured with no protection.
5. Phishing/Social Engineering
Attackers leveraging simple phishing methods or social engineering techniques may target developers or administrators of cloud-based systems to obtain their cloud console or API key password.
6. Third Party Tools are Compromised
Compromised software downloads or vendor-supplied apps that use shared common service accounts will expose the credentials of the perpetrator.
How Attackers Exploit Shared Credentials
Attacks utilizing shared credentials are fast and can be conducted with high scalability, as follows:
1. Validation: Attackers will quickly determine the validity of "keys" by using a Cloud CLI command.
a) AWS: aws sts get caller identity
b) Azure: az account show
c) GCP: gcloud auth list
2. Enumeration/Reconnaissance: Attackers will now enumerate the resources in the cloud environment where they had access to the account information to identify resources, IAM policy, storage buckets, databases, and compute instances.
3. Privilege Escalation: Attackers are able to escalate their privileges when using shared credentials (by way of excessively permissive policy roles) to be able to access the cloud provider’s admin policies or create an additional user to assume other privileged roles.
4. Lateral movement and ongoing access
a) Spin up assets for cryptomining
b) Extract data from storage or databases
c) Install backdoors or alter IAM for long-term access
d) Pivot between connected SaaS tools or on-premises systems using VPN or RDP
5. Monetization Common outcomes include selling data stolen during an attack, deploying ransomware, and reselling access via underground markets.
Attackers are commonly employing multiple methodologies to gain access via the usage of shared credentials in conjunction with other methods such as abusing trust relationships from GitHub to AWS to use OIDC (OpenID Connect) credentials for access, or abusing/API accesses that are open to public.
Practical Defense Tips for SMEs and Startups
1. Eliminate the Use of Long-lived Credentials Use temporary security credentials and IAM role-based permissions (e.g., EC2/Lambda, Workload Identity Federation (GCP/Azure)) in conjunction with short-lived tokens, wherever feasible.
2. Rotate Keys and Monitor them regularly ensure regular key rotation every 90 days) and use cloud-based tools to identify old or unused keys.
3. Management of Secrets Utilize AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or Google Cloud Platform Secret Manager to protect your sensitive information (never include these in code or environment variables).
4. Least Privilege Everywhere always apply the principle of least privilege to IAM roles, service principals and service accounts; regularly audit permissions.
5. Conducting scans and detection of repositories and pipelines for released tools like TruffleHog/native secret detection tools (e.g., AWS CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs) should trigger alerts if any suspicious activity is detected via an API call.
6. Require MFA for all Console logins and establish rules for access conditions.
7. Implement continuous monitoring using CSPM and behavioral detection tools to identify unusual use of authorized credentials.
Low-budget teams should leverage free built-in features to be able to: enable IAM Credential Reports, setup basic alerting, and run periodic repository scans.
Key Takeaways
1. Public leaks, information-stealing malware (infostealers), misconfigured systems, and social engineering (e.g. phishing) all expose shared credentials.
2. Exploiting exploited credentials is easy and quickly leads to reconnaissance, escalated privilege, or other forms of damage in the attacker's environment.
3. Many modern types of attacks take advantage of credentialing abuse combined with finding an exploit in third-party software or compromising third-party vendors.
4. Avoiding credential abuses requires eliminating long-lived secrets and providing only least privilege access to credentialed users, as well as monitoring users.
5. Proper credential hygiene (using strong passwords, using two-factor authentication, etc.) helps protect privacy rights and also reduces risk from supply chain breaches.
Treating every credential as potentially shared and verifying its usage is one of the most effective ways to harden cloud environments without major spending.
